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DCI Briefing for
Vinson Committee

16 January 1963

CUBA

I.

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[redacted] we have concluded that since

late October the Soviets have withdrawn 42 strategic missiles and 42 jet bombers and their related equipment, and about five thousand personnel probably associated with the maintenance and operation of this equipment.

- A. We believe that this represents all strategic weapons placed in Cuba by the Soviets.
 - 1. The four strategic missile bases have been dismantled and no IL-28 bomber aircraft remain in sight.
- B. Several categories of missiles remain in Cuba. These include surface-to-air, short range surface-to-surface coastal defense, and missiles for Komar type coastal ships. Quantities of these missiles may be stored in caves in Cuba together with other items of conventional armament. We doubt that attempts have been made to hide intermediate range strategic missiles in caves, but

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this can not be proven by aerial reconnaissance which we are carrying on each day, weather permitting.

C. Our program of aerial reconnaissance, [redacted]

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[redacted] will, in our opinion, reveal any steps taken to reintroduce strategic missiles or to reactivate strategic weapons systems.

II. Despite the withdrawals noted there is still a substantial Soviet military presence in Cuba.

A. [redacted]

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[redacted] we conclude that:

1. approximately 17,000 Soviet military personnel remain,


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6. permanent barracks and other facilities are under construction to house these units.

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IV. There is no detectible change in the Castro regime's goals or methods.

A. Some reports indicate sharp differences between Castro and the Soviets over the withdrawal of offensive weapons but these differences have not reached a breaking point, nor have they impaired Castro's control of the political life of Cuba and its economic program.

B. Castro's continued hatred for the United States and his determination to foment revolutions in Latin America were clear in his January 2nd speech, and his 16 January speech.

C. Castro's decision to release the Cuban prisoners was based on his judgment and the judgment of his advisers that the arrangement represented a good deal from his standpoint.

V. The Cuban economy continues to deteriorate, with no signs that an upturn will occur soon.

A. Present indications are that this year's sugar crop--still the mainstay of the economy--may amount to less than last year's poor crop of 4.8 million tons.

(Average annual crop about 6 million tons.)

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B. Negotiations are presently under way to decide the level of Cuba's 1963 trade relations with bloc countries. Preliminary announcements of the results of these talks have been vague and have mentioned only that trade will increase this year.

C. Cuba's commerce with non-bloc countries is continuing to shrink, which in turn will make it more expensive for the bloc to keep Cuba afloat economically.

D.

shortages of food and other consumer goods, but our evidence still

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suggests that such shortages are irritants rather than major inducements to revolt.

VI. We see no evidence of a Soviet decision to make further withdrawals of military equipment and personnel from Cuba. However, this is a definite possibility with the passage of time. At the present, however, we summarize the situation in Cuba as follows: Castro remains in control, his attitudes seem unchanged, and the Soviets retain an important military capability in Cuba.